First published in 1911 as the second edition of a 1900 original, this book provides a basic introduction to astronomy written by the former Astronomer Royal of Ireland. The text is illustrated with photographs, diagrams and drawings of astronomical phenomena, including certain comets and the constellations visible from the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of education and the teaching of astronomy.

The phrase per remos alii (Aen. 10.290) has baffled Vergil scholars for centuries, in which regard they have all just guessed at its meaning without citing any evidence to justify their views. During the 1960s, Gilbert Highet proposed a solution to the problem after seeing a scene in a Hollywood film in which a famous actor “ran down the oars” (i. e., ran over or along or across the oars)-a solution Highet would mention in his Vergil classes but never researched (...) for publication. This article attempts to justify Highet’s suggestion by considering, beyond the cinematic and related contemporary evidence, a variety of classical, medieval, and archaeological sources of information. (shrink)

This book presents introductions to the essential mathematical aspects of complexity science, suitable for advanced undergraduate/masters-level students and researchers.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Complete Poems of Tibullus: An En Face Bilingual Edition by Rodney G. DennisRobert J. BallRodney G. Dennis and Michael C. J. Putnam, trans. The Complete Poems of Tibullus: An En Face Bilingual Edition. With intro. by J. Haig Gaisser. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012. x + 159 pp. Hardcover, $52.95, Paperback, $20.95.This welcome edition of Tibullus’ elegies contains a two-page preface, a twenty-eight-page introduction, an en (...) face bilingual text and translation of the elegies of Tibullus, Lygdamus, and Sulpicia, a seven-page section of notes, a ten-page glossary, an appendix containing a text and translation of Ovid Amores 3.9 (Ovid’s memorial to Tibullus), a select bibliography, and a general index.As related in the preface, after the death of Rodney Dennis, Curator of Manuscripts for twenty-five years at Harvard University’s Houghton Library, Michael Putnam and Julia Gaisser agreed to bring to fruition the Tibullus translation Dennis had worked on, which Dennis had wanted Gaisser to help him perfect and for which he had wanted Putnam to write the introduction. Putnam and Gaisser decided to reverse the roles that had been envisioned for them by Dennis, with the revision of the translation (and the addition of the poetry of Lygdamus and Sulpicia) diligently executed by Putnam, Professor Emeritus of Classics at Brown University, and the introduction insightfully authored by Gaisser, Professor Emerita of Latin at Bryn Mawr College.Gaisser’s introduction examines 1) the world of the Roman elegists, especially how, in an era of brilliant poets, the elegists defined their genre; 2) the themes and characters in Tibullus’ elegies and how the characters help shape the [End Page 295] arrangement of his poems; and 3) what the elegies of Lygdamus and Sulpicia have and do not have in common with those of the other elegists. Gaisser’s fine comment, “His [Tibullus’] poems glide easily, some would say dreamily, from theme to theme, moving almost like a slide show through apparently random images and musings” (1), recalls statements of some of the poet’s admirers at the dawn of the twentieth century, such as Johannes Vahlen, who likened the movement of the elegies to the tide of a summer sea. Gaisser takes the middle ground, as appropriate, in seeing Tibullus as a poet who speaks through a persona, yet who has “some (perhaps many) points in common with his creator” (7)—as he very likely does—since even within the context of his alternate universe, he touches on the contemporary world, where he refers to people and events outside the poem’s web of self-reference. Yet one may question Gaisser’s unqualified comment that “Tibullus’ poetic techniques are Alexandrian at almost every level” (17)—a thesis developed by Francis Cairns based on Hellenistic evidence of a fragmentary nature, substantiated by Alexandrian elements in some of Tibullus’ verses but with little relevance to those elegies governed by non-Alexandrian literary sources.The bilingual text and translation include the sixteen elegies written by Tibullus (1.1–10 and 2.1–6), the six by Lygdamus (3.1–6), and the six by Sulpicia (3.13–18 = 4.7–12); not included are the Panegyric of Messalla (3.7 = 4.1), the Garland of Sulpicia (3.8–12 = 4.2–6), and the elegy and epigram of debatable authorship appearing at the end of the corpus (3.19–20 = 4.13–14). In preparing this edition of the elegies, Putnam has followed, appropriately, Georg Luck’s Teubner text (Stuttgart 1988, rev. in 1998)—a text containing the most complete list of Tibullus’ manuscripts ever assembled and the most extensive citation of variants and conjectures for the poems, which Putnam supplements with his own variants. Verse form presents a serious challenge for anyone attempting to translate classical poetry into English, inasmuch as classical meters are quantitative whereas English verse is accentual; although translations of classical verses into the original meters may well result in a metrical tour de force, they tend to have a jingly sound, which can obscure and overshadow the poet’s artistry. Philip Dunlop translated some of Tibullus’ elegies into free... (shrink)

The verse hinc subitae mortes atque intestata senectus has long fuelled considerable debate and discussion among classical scholars. This hexameter occurs in the passage of the first satire that describes the aspect of the patron-client relationship where the rich patron, ignoring the plight of his poor and hungry clients, enjoys a sumptuous but deadly feast. After dining on delicacies such as boar and peacock, he bathes on a bloated stomach, causing him to die suddenly and apparently intestate, and causing those (...) angry at being deprived of their legacy to cheer at his funeral :quanta est gula quae sibi totosponit apros, animal propter conuiuia natum!poena tamen praesens, cum tu deponis amictusturgidus et crudum pauonem in balnea portas.hinc subitae mortes atque intestata senectus.it noua nec tristis per cunctas fabula cenas;ducitur iratis plaudendum funus amicis. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich in einer praxeologischen Perspektive mit den Wirkungen, die compu­ter- und videogestützte Spielanalysen im professionellen Fußball entfalten können. Es werden Wis­senspraktiken skizziert, die sich mit dem Einsatz von Spielanalysesoftware herausgebildet haben und es werden daran anknüpfend konzeptionelle Überlegungen präsentiert, die in zwei Richtungen weitergeführt werden: Zum einen werden sie auf zentrale Grundannahmen der Praxeologie bezo­gen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die Analyse der Wirkungen und Potentiale reflexiver Wissens- und Kön­nensformen in Praktiken ein Desiderat der praxissoziologischen Perspektive darstellt. (...) Zum anderen werden aus den konzeptionellen Überlegungen zum softwaregestützten accounting Ideen zu den damit induzierten Veränderungen des Fußballspiels und des professionellen Fußballs entwickelt. (shrink)

Stewart Cohen’s New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa, involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. More specifically, we show that the two (...) readings of sentences involving the word ‘justified’ which are required for Comesaña’s solution to the problem are not recoverable within the two-dimensional framework of Robert Stalnaker to which he appeals. We then consider, and reject, an attempt to overcome this difficulty by appeal to a complication of the theory involving counterfactuals, and conclude the paper by sketching our own preferred solution to Cohen’s New Evil Demon. (shrink)

Relational priming is argued to be a deeply inadequate model of analogy-making because of its intrinsic inability to do analogies where the base and target domains share no common attributes and the mapped relations are different. Leech et al. rely on carefully handcrafted representations to allow their model to make a complex analogy, seemingly unaware of the debate on this issue fifteen years ago. Finally, they incorrectly assume the existence of fixed, context-independent relations between objects.

As a transplant surgeon at California Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco, I cannot forget those cases where I faced forks in the road and had to decide whether the right direction lay in the well-charted direction of objective metrics or immeasurable feelings of intuition. I carry those cases with me still.

This paper introduces a little-known episode in the history of physics, in which a mathematical proof by Pierre Fermat vindicated Galileo’s characterization of freefall. The first part of the paper reviews the historical context leading up to Fermat’s proof. The second part illustrates how a physical and a mathematical insight enabled Fermat’s result, and that a simple modification would satisfy any of Fermat’s critics. The result is an illustration of how a purely theoretical argument can settle an apparently empirical debate.

The broad aim of this introduction to a Special Issue on “Susceptibilities: Toward a Cultural Politics of Consent under Erasure” is to broach key questions and research directions that illuminate contemporary public debates about the conditions and limits of conscious intention (and consent as a byproduct thereof), which is typically treated as a “property” that can be “underdeveloped”, “given”, or “taken away”. In keeping with Jacques Derrida’s repudiation of the metaphysics of presence, the perspective animating this essay is that the (...) psychoanalytic standpoint of the unconscious deconstructs the epistemological privilege of determinacy, consistency, and wholeness in treatments of intentional consciousness. Given Jean Laplanche’s attention to the residues of coherent ego fetishism in Sigmund Freud’s oeuvre, the former’s critique of self-sovereignty as evinced in his theorization of the “enigmatic signifier”, “primal repression”, and “afterwardsness” assumes a pivotal role in the analysis of how writers as represented here by Sarah Polley in Run Towards the Danger narrate the vicissitudes of their traumatic memories of sexual assault. Ultimately, then, the implications of this analysis will carry over to brief discussions of this Special Issue’s seven contributions by Melissa Wright, Karen McFadyen, J. Asher Godley, Madeleine Reddon, Gautam Basu Thakur, Robert Hughes, and Rebecca Saunders. (shrink)

Surprisingly, the dimples on a golf ball (typically around 300-400) cannot be spaced evenly on the surface. I will explain how this is connected to the Platonic solids. The example is interesting, because it illustrates a difference between efficient and formal causation and explanation. I will discuss a few interesting consequences.

A form of Kripke's schema turns out to be equivalent to each of the following two statements from metric topology: every open subspace of a separable metric space is separable; every open subset of a separable metric space is a countable union of open balls. Thus Kripke's schema serves as a point of reference for classifying theorems of classical mathematics within Bishop-style constructive reverse mathematics.

Each relational structure X has an associated Gaifman graph, which endows X with the properties of a graph. If x is an element of X, let $B_n (x)$ be the ball of radius n around x. Suppose that X is infinite, connected and of bounded degree. A first-order sentence ϕ in the language of X is almost surely true (resp. a. s. false) for finite substructures of X if for every x ∈ X, the fraction of substructures of $B_n (...) (x)$ satisfying ϕ approaches 1 (resp. 0) as n approaches infinity. Suppose further that, for every finite substructure, X has a disjoint isomorphic substructure. Then every ϕ is a. s. true or a. s. false for finite substructures of X. This is one form of the geometric zero-one law. We formulate it also in a form that does not mention the ambient infinite structure. In addition, we investigate various questions related to the geometric zero-one law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76. A REFUTATION OF HUME'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY1 Given Hume's conceptions of space and time, which I take to be fundamental to his theory of causality, it is not always possible to meet all of those conditions definitive of the cause-effect relation, i.e., those "general rules, by which we may know when" objects really 2 are "causes or effects to each other" (T. 173). To show this, it will (...) be necessary, first, to give a very brief exposition of Hume's conceptions of space and time, with regard chiefly to their implications for the nature of motion. Then, after briefly summarizing his views on the nature of the cause-effect relation, I shall proceed immediately to my objection. It should be noted first, however, that, if one instance of a cause-effect relation can be found to which Hume's analysis will not apply, that, presumably, would be sufficient to refute his theory. I shall not here repeat all of Hume's arguments for the indivisibility of space and time. Suffice it to say, he takes it to be fairly obvious that each must consist of a finite number of indivisible points or moments, each of which is distinct, and therefore separate, from every other, and, in the case of time, none of which ever "co-exist." Only one of his arguments for the indivisibility of space need concern us here. The argument is brief: The infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is evident from the nature of motion. If the latter, therefore, be impossible, the former must be equally so. (T. 31) The argument here seems, roughly, to be this: the motion of an object can be described only by giving its positions at various times (the nature of motion). If, therefore, an object, such as a ball moving along a line AB, can be assigned an infinite number of positions taken between A and B (the infinite divisibility of space), 77. the time taken to traverse AB must also be infinite, i.e., must consist of an infinite number of instants. But the finite time taken to traverse the distance AB is not infinitely divisible; therefore, neither is the line AB. This argument, of course, relies upon the assumption that, in traversing the line AB, the ball will occupy each of the points (whether finite or infinite) of which it consists. The argument can also be turned around so as to derive the finite divisibility of time from that of space. Here, too, it must be assumed that the ball occupies each of those instants which constitute the time taken to traverse the line AB. It thus seems clear that, on Hume's view, the ball's motion can be neither more nor less divisible than the space and time it takes to move. x In its motion from A to B, then, the ball will occupy first one, then another of the points lying between A and B until finally it has occupied them all and has moved from A to B. But, in saying that it will occupy first one and then another, we are saying nothing more than that it successively occupies a series of points, and, insofar as its occupation of these different points is successive, it takes time. We are in a position, then, to define motion (at least motion along a straight line) as "the successive occupation of adjacent, linearly ordered points or places." Now, this is very different from the usual conception of motion. The ball's motion between any two adjacent points is not a moving from one to the other. It is simply its being in the one place at one instant and its being in the other place at the next. It is not a continuous motion, but the occupation of discrete places at different times. It is, as it were, a series of instantaneous leaps. This interpretation, if it is accurate, may also serve to account for Hume's ill-understood propensity for 78. referring to cause and effect as objects rather than as events. Events must, on Hume's view of time at least, be essentially static. Unlike those... (shrink)

While strolling the streets of Amsterdam, Sidney Smith, the renowned editor of the Edinburgh Review, called the attention of his companion to two Dutch housewives who were leaning out of their windows and arguing with one another across the narrow alley that separated their houses. Smith remarked to his companion that the two women would never agree. His friend thought the seasoned editor had in mind the stubborn Dutch character. No, said Smith. Rather it was because they were arguing from (...) different premises. In recent articles, Stephen Ball (1988) and Bart Voorzanger (1987) have objected strongly to my defense of evolutionary ethics. In their reconstruction of my arguments, however, they have assigned to me premises different from those upon which my original defense stood. Their objections may demolish the arguments they have reconstructed, but fortunately my theory does not reside thereon. They have made Dutch objections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:51. HOW NOT TO REFUTE HUME'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY: A REPLY TO GRAY Mr. Robert Gray's alleged refutation of Hume's theory of causality does not strike me as being in reality conclusive. The essential element in his alleged refutation, if I have understood it correctly, is that when two billiard balls strike one another and stop - a paradigm of cause and effect - the striking and the (...) stopping constitute one event as opposed to two. They occupy, as a result, one and the same time, a state of affairs inconsistent with the Humean view that the cause immediately precedes the effect. But, surely, they would, if they are the same event, occupy by parity of reasoning one and the same position. For Hume's theory of space and time, as Gray describes it, implies that there is a one-to-one mapping between positions and times. If, therefore, their being the same event implies that they occupy one and the same time, it would also imply that they occupy one and the same position. And if they occupy the same position, they are not spatially contiguous, a state of affairs inconsistent with the Humean view that the cause is spatially contiguous to the effect. A Humean solution in both cases seems clear. It is to allow that the striking and stopping of the billiard balls are the same event and to seek its cause in their moving towards one another, i.e. to seek it in billiard ball A's being at A, and billiard ball B's being at B,, where both A, and B, are spatially contiguous with and immediately precede the striking and stopping of the respective billiard balls B and A. Gray resists this solution, but only because he is implicitly committed to the anti-Humean view that one and the same event can occupy two different positions at one and the same time. As a result, where A designates the 52. position where billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B and stops it and B designates the position where billiard ball B strikes billiard ball A and stops it - this being simply a re-descriptiön in Gray's view of what happens in the single event of two billiard balls striking one another and stopping - he holds that A is different from B. If A is different from B, then by relocating the cause of billiard ball A's stopping at B, we have sacrificed the spatial contiguity of cause and effect. For B will intervene between position B,, that of the cause, and A, that of the effect. And the same will hold with obvious adjustments when we relocate the cause of billiard ball B's stopping at A,. Fortunately, however, Hume need only reply that A is one and the same as B. Indeed, if he is to be consistent with his theory of space and time, this must be his reply. This reply, moreover, is necessary to Hume's explanation of how the reciprocal striking of billiard ball A and billiard ball B can exist in the first place. Such a phenomenon requires a point of contact, a point common to a part of both billiard balls. This point of contact, it should be clear, is provided by the point designated by both A and B. Robert A. Imlay University of Toronto "A Refutation of Hume's Theory of Causality," Hume Studies, Vol. II (1976), pp. 76-85.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When Hyperbole Enters Politics: What Can Be Learned From Antiquity and Our Hyperbolist-In-Chief W. ROBERT CONNOR introduction: an age of hyperbole Everywhere we turn these days we encounter hyperbole—in the colloquialisms of every day speech, advertising, salesmanship, letters of recommendation, sports-casting, and not least in political discourse. This may be a good moment, then, to open a conversation between ancient and modern understandings of verbal “over-shoot,” as the (...) Greek term for exaggeration might be rendered in English. The evidence gathered in H. Lausberg’s Handbook of Literary Rhetoric1 shows that while ancient rhetoricians agreed that hyperbole should be counted among the “figures of speech,” they found much to argue about: was hyperbole a violation of the Aristotelian middle course, hence an extreme to be avoided, or was it a legitimate form of augmentation (auxēsis in Greek, amplificatio in Latin)? Could diminution (meiōsis ) also be regarded as a form of hyperbole? In the interpretation of texts hyperbole poses a further difficulty —unlike simile, alliteration or some other figures of speech, it is “unmarked,” that is, it has no linguistic sign to alert the reader to its presence. Hyperbole likes to disguise itself as if it were going to a masquerade ball, presenting itself as simile or wearing metaphorical dress, or appearing not infrequently as litotes. It can sneak up on you and take you by surprise. The critic Longinus in On the Sublime, ch. 38, and some rhetoricians noted that hyperbole could be most arion 26.3 winter 2019 powerful when least recognized. Many ancient rhetoricians and some modern critics, however, have followed Quintilian, who asserted that “expressions (often hyperbolic), such as “storms of public assemblies, thunderbolts of eloquence, are used merely for ornament” (Institutes 8.6.7). In this view hyperbole is a conspicuous ornament used to embellish speech and make it more elegant and attractive, but today it is more often treated either as an excuse for an outrageous statement (as when the CEO of Cambridge Analytica characterized as “a certain amount of hyperbole” his suggestion of using prostitutes to discredit a political opponent), or as a euphemism for a falsehood (as when a politician promises he will eliminate the national debt—$20 trillion—and his budget director shrugs the claim off as “hyperbole.”) The term seems to extinguish any feeling of embarrassment. None of these understandings of hyperbole is simply wrong, but together they eclipse an alternative view, grounded in one ancient understanding of language, and corroborated by modern experience. In this approach language in general and hyperbole in particular are not simply a set of signs whose meaning is arbitrarily determined by social convention. Instead, they have their own nature (physis, as Isocrates says in Panegyricus 8) and hence their own power to arouse and motivate listeners. Hyperbole, viewed in this light, is a force in its own right, with the ability to give voice to otherwise unarticulated emotions, to intensify them, to push aside doubts and hesitations, and then to turn feelings into action. Language is power, and hyperbole, as an extreme form of language, provides great power to those who use it skillfully. These need not be the docile students of the rhetoricians ; politicians sometimes seem to have an innate understanding of it. The extreme breed among them, the demagogues, are often the ones who know best how to put this extreme of language to use. True, you don’t have to be a politician to put hyperbole to work. It is a favorite mode of speech among lovers, poets, travellers. Holy Men use it, too: Jesus of Nazareth, for exam16 when hyperbole enters politics ple, proclaimed that it was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God (Matthew 19.24). Almost everyone uses it at some point, except policy wonks whose soulless prose withers before its onslaughts. When people use hyperbole they may be neither lying nor embroidering the truth to make it more ornamental. They exalt and intensify what they see as truth, make it come alive, and thereby rouse their listeners from apathy and distraction. Ordinary people, too, use... (shrink)

In the first sentence of his thematically innovative book, Mark A. Cheetham informs us that Kant, Art, and Art History “examines the far-reaching and varied reception of Immanuel Kant’s thought in art history and the practicing visual arts from the late eighteenth century to the present”. This is surely a long-overdue project in Kant scholarship, and Cheetham deserves praise for having finally put this intellectual ball into play. He then sets one of his methodological assumptions squarely on the table: (...) “there is no pure Kant and no secure border between the many areas that he has influenced”. Cheetham recognizes no secure borders between “art,” “art history,” and “philosophy,” since Kant clearly influenced all three. (shrink)

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning (...) “authoritative normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)

Robert Wilson’s The Eugenic Mind Project is a major achievement of engaged scholarship and socially relevant philosophy and history of science. It exemplifies the virtues of interdisciplinarity. As principal investigator of the Living Archives on Eugenics in Western Canada project, while employed in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Alberta, Wilson encountered a proverbial big ball of mud with questions and issues that involved local individuals living through a painful set of memories and implicated his institutional (...) home in outstanding moral obligations. It is engaged scholarship because it required building relationships with affected persons and taking responsibility for his institution’s legacy, as well as transforming Wilson’s own outlook along the way. It is socially relevant philosophy and history of science because it brings to light issues that remain salient today, especially how eugenic themes are ubiquitous in societal discourse and evinced in everyday decisions. It is interdisciplinary because to accomplish this type of analysis requires intellectual gymnastics that range over diverse domains of research: from standpoint theory and disability studies to oral history and governmental policy; from the evolutionary biology of prosociality and variation to conceptual questions about the categorization of human traits and types. (shrink)

The challenge of calling "balls and strikes": the curious case of Gould v. Roberts -- To flatlaw and beyond : appreciating multiple analytic dimensions -- The traditions of legal reasoning : developing analytical legitimacy despite substantive disagreement -- Rethinking the analytic tradition : text, context, hypertext, and subtext -- The challenge of text : the relationship of "is," "ought," and focal meaning -- The challenge of context : what "is" means in both facts and law -- The challenge of hypertext (...) : the struggle within "ought" of multiple perspectives on fundamental values -- The challenge of subtext : considering the judiciary's role in the "game" of legal life -- The right (or rights?) to privacy (or privacies?) -- The never-ending disagreements over statutory interpretation : the primacy of subtext. (shrink)

This book provides an overall theory of perception and much of a theory of knowledge. It explains how we can have justified beliefs and knowledge concerning the physical world, the abstract realm, and the normative domain of right and wrong.

In celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics, a review is undertaken to compare the lists of principles in various bioethical theories to determine the extent to which the various lists can be reconciled. Included are the single principle theories of utilitarianism, libertarianism, Hippocratism, and the theories of Pellegrino, Engelhardt, The Belmont Report, Beauchamp and Childress, Ross, Veatch, and Gert. We find theories all offering lists of principles numbering from one to (...) ten. Many of the differences can be reconciled, but some critical differences remain. (shrink)

Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psychological continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative memory of some kind, special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person’s psychological states can physically extend beyond that person’s (...) body. Since “person” is a term of both metaphysical and moral significance, and discussions of both extended minds and personal identity have often focused on memory, this article explores the relevance of extended cognition for the identity of persons with special attention to neuroethics and memory. (shrink)

The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of "respectability" accorded to conventional war. In this radical and cogent argument for pacifism, Robert Holmes asserts that all war--not (...) just nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world. Addressing a wide audience of informed and concerned readers, he raises dramatic questions about the concepts of "political realism" and nuclear deterrence, makes a number of persuasive suggestions for nonviolent alternatives to war, and presents a rich panorama of thinking about war from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr and Herman Kahn. Holmes's positions are compellingly presented and will provoke discussion both among convinced pacifists and among those whom he calls "militarists." "Militarists," we realize after reading this book, include the majority of us who live a friendly and peaceful personal life while supporting a system which, if Holmes is correct, guarantees war and risks eventual human extinction. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Vision constitutes an interesting domain, or range of domains, for debate over the extended mind thesis, the idea that minds physically extend beyond the boundaries of the body. In part this is because vision and visual experience more particularly are sometimes presented as a kind of line in the sand for what we might call externalist creep about the mind: once all reasonable concessions have been made to externalists about the mind, visual experience marks a line beyond which lies a (...) safe haven for individualists. Here I want to put a little more pressure on such a view of visual experience, as well as to offer a more constructive, positive argument in defense of the idea of extended vision. (shrink)

This book reveals how, when, where and why vitalism and its relationship to new scientific theories, philosophies and concepts of energy became seminal from the fin de siècle until the Second World War for such Modernists as Sophie Tauber-Arp, Hugo Ball, Juliette Bisson, Eva Carrière, Salvador Dalì, Robert Delaunay, Marcel Duchamp, Edvard Munch, Picasso, Yves Tanguy, Gino Severini and John Cage. For them Vitalism entailed the conception of life as a constant process of metamorphosis impelled by the free (...) flow of energies, imaginings, intuition and memories, unconstrained by mechanistic materialism and chronometric imperatives, to generate what the philosopher Henri Bergson aptly called Creative Evolution. Following the three main dimensions of Vitalist Modernism, the first part of this book reveals how biovitalism at the fin de siècle entailed the pursuit of corporeal regeneration through absorption in raw nature, wholesome environments, aquatic therapies, electromagnetism, heliotherapy, modern sports, particularly rugby; water sports, the Olympic Games and physical culture to energize the human body and vitalize its life force. This is illuminated by artists as geoculturally diverse as Gustave Caillebotte, Thomas Eakins, Munch and Albert Gleizes. The second part illuminates how simultaneously vitalism became aligned with anthroposophy, esotericism, magnetism, occultism, parapsychology, spiritism, theosophy and what Bergson called "psychic states", alongside such new sciences as electromagnetism, radiology and the Fourth Dimension, as captured by such artists as Juliette Bisson, Giacomo Balla, Albert Besnard, Umberto Boccioni, Eva Carrière, John Gerrard Keulemans, László Mohology-Nagy, James Tissot, Albert von Schrenck Notzing and Picasso. During and after the devastation of the First World War, the third part explores how Vitalism, particularly Bergson's theory of becoming, became associated with Dadaist, Neo-Dadaist and Surrealist notions of amorality, atemporality, dysfunctionality, entropy, irrationality, inversion, negation and the nonsensical captured by Hans Arp, Charlie Chaplin, Theo Van Doesburg, Kazimir Malevich, Kurt Schwitters and Vladimir Tatlin alongside Cage's concept of Nothing. After investigating the widespread engagement with Bergson's philosophies, Vitalism and art by Anarchists, Marxists and Communists during and after the First World War, it concludes with the official rejection of Bergson and any form of Vitalism in the Soviet Union under Stalin. This book will be of vital interest to gallery, exhibition and museum curators and visitors plus readers and scholars working in art history, art theory, cultural studies, modernist studies, occult studies, European art and literature, health, histories of science, philosophy, psychology, sociology, sport studies, heritage studies, museum studies and curatorship. (shrink)

In 1958, economist A. W. Phillips published an article describing what he observed to be the inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment; subsequently, the "Phillips curve" became a central concept in macroeconomic analysis and policymaking. But today's Phillips curve is not the same as the original one from fifty years ago; the economy, our understanding of price setting behavior, the determinants of inflation, and the role of monetary policy have evolved significantly since then. In this book, some of the top (...) economists working today reexamine the theoretical and empirical validity of the Phillips curve in its more recent specifications. The contributors consider such questions as what economists have learned about price and wage setting and inflation expectations that would improve the way we use and formulate the Phillips curve, what the Phillips curve approach can teach us about inflation dynamics, and how these lessons can be applied to improving the conduct of monetary policy. ContributorsLawrence Ball, Ben Bernanke, Oliver Blanchard, V. V. Chari, William T. Dickens, Stanley Fischer, Jeff Fuhrer, Jordi Gali, Michael T. Kiley, Robert G. King, Donald L. Kohn, Yolanda K. Kodrzycki, Jane Sneddon Little, Bartisz Mackowiak, N. Gregory Mankiw, Virgiliu Midrigan, Giovanni P. Olivei, Athanasios Orphanides, Adrian R. Pagan, Christopher A. Pissarides, Lucrezia Reichlin, Paul A. Samuelson, Christopher A. Sims, Frank R. Smets, Robert M. Solow, Jürgen Stark, James H. Stock, Lars E. O. Svensson, John B. Taylor, Mark W. Watson. (shrink)

This innovative volume presents an insightful philosophical portrait of the life and work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Focuses on the concept of the sublime as it clarifies Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory, moral theory and asceticism Explores the substantial relationships between Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity Defends Schopenhauer’s position that absolute truth can be known and described as a blindly striving, all-permeating, universal “Will” Examines the influence of Asian philosophy on Schopenhauer Describes the relationships between Schopenhauer’s thought and that of Hegel, (...) Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein. (shrink)